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ABSTRACT
Entrepreneur-investor negotiations are pivotal for ventures in need of funding. Yet, to date, little
is known about the dynamics of these negotiations. We investigate a critical feature of this
phenomenon by examining the role of technology, via cognitive heuristics, in shaping
entrepreneur and investor perceptions as well as subsequent negotiation outcomes. In a
controlled laboratory setting, we simulated 103 negotiations between entrepreneurs and
investors. We hypothesize and find that there is a pervasive technology bias that influences the
perceptions of both parties of the negotiation, and consequently negotiation outcomes. Our
findings offer unique insights into the relationships of technology, cognitive heuristics, and
negotiations. We discuss the implications for both practitioners and theoreticians in the areas of
technology, decision making, negotiations, and entrepreneurial financing.

Keywords: entrepreneurship, investors, negotiation, technology, techno-optimism

1. Introduction
The ability of entrepreneurs to secure resources is key challenge facing entrepreneurial
ventures seeking to get off the ground and to grow (Sullivan & Ford, 2014). The literature has
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identified several types of resources that are key to entrepreneurial ventures including human,
social, financial, physical, technology, and organizational resources (Brush, Greene, & Hart,
2001; Wu, 2007). While each of these sources resources is important to entrepreneurial venture
success, a great breadth of the literature has focused on financial resources (Denis, 2004; Drover,
Busenitz, Matusik, Townsend, Anglin, & Dushnitsky, 2017). The importance of financial
resources is derived, in part, from the ability to use funding to procure other resources needed by
the venture (Cai, Hughes, & Yin, 2014). Thus, financing is a pivotal resource which
entrepreneurs need to secure to succeed (Desa & Basu, 2013; Ebbers & Wijnberg, 2012; Mata,
1994) and acquiring capital is central for a venture to grow from an idea into a productive firm
(Brown & Lee, 2019).
Numerous financing options exist for entrepreneurs to pursue (Angerer, Niemand, Kraus,
& Thies, 2018; Burgelman & Hitt, 2007; De Clercq, Fried, Lehtonen, & Sapienza, 2006). In
2017 alone in the United States, venture capitalists (VCs) invested $71.9B in 5,052 ventures
(MoneyTree, 2018), angel investors contributed $23.9B to 61,560 ventures (Sohl, 2018), and
crowdfunding contributed $919.3M to 177,300 ventures (Statista, 2018). Of course, not all
ventures are created equal, and those which are deemed more valuable are likely to be more
effective at securing financial backing (MacMillan, Seigel, & Narasimha, 1985; Robinson,
1987). If an entrepreneurial investor perceives a proposed venture to have more potential for
growth, and therefore provide them a better return, the investor will likely be more eager to
invest in the start-up (Ganzach, 2000; Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984). Similarly, if an entrepreneur
perceives their venture to have more potential for success, they likely expect to be effective at
acquiring funding (Anglin, Short, Drover, Stevenson, McKenny, & Allison, 2018). While those
principles follow intuitional logic, our understanding of how entrepreneur’s and investor’s
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negotiation behavior affects this process is incomplete. Thus, due to the critical role of resource
acquisition in the success of startup ventures, in this study we seek to gain insight into whether
perceptions of technology impact the negotiation between entrepreneurs and venture investors.
Specifically, we posit that overoptimism about emerging technologies can influence perceptions
of success potential more for some ventures than for others.
The investment decision represents a pivotal point for both the entrepreneur (seeking
external funding) and the investor (seeking a profitable investment) (Eckhardt, Shane, & Delmar,
2006; Lagazio & Querci, 2018). As many entrepreneurs operate under significant resource
constraints (Desa & Basu, 2013), being able to acquire outside capital is often the only way
entrepreneurs can successfully get their small businesses off the ground, and has been shown to
influence the likelihood of business failure (Beckman et al., 2007; Shane & Stuart, 2002).
Furthermore, the entrepreneur risks the time lost during the process of seeking financing, the
possibility of not receiving financing or not getting fully funded, the negative reputation of a
failed venture, and possible debts that such a failure could create among other things (Ucbasaran,
Shepherd, Lockett, & Lyon, 2013).
Due to the inherent uncertainty associated with early stage investment, the decision by an
investor to fund a project can result in a variety of outcomes ranging from receiving a significant
return to losing the entire investment (Mason & Harrison, 2002). These risks deter investment in
projects deemed too risky or underdeveloped by investors (Lerner, 1995; Lerner, 1998). The
risks investors face are most prominently related to the direct return of an investment
(MacMillan, Seigel, & Naraimha, 1985; Robinson, 1987), but can also involve the costs of
missed opportunities in alternative investments (MacMillan, Zemann, & Subbanaransimha,
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1987). To understand the investment decision, the entrepreneurship literature has examined
various factors that influence early stage funding decisions.
Characteristics of the project, the entrepreneur(s), and the investor(s) all factor into the
venture financing decision (Rai & Lin, 2019; Schwienbacher, 2007; Shane & Cable, 2002). The
decision to invest has also been found to be based on individual factors such as investor
experience (Freear, Sohl, & Wetzel, 2002; Kaustia & Knüpfer, 2008; Lahti, 2011; Van
Osnabrugge, 1998), investor/entrepreneur information (Gompers, 1995; Hsu, 2007), entrepreneur
passion (Cardon, Sudek, & Mitteness, 2009; Mitteness, Sudek, & Cardon, 2012; Sudek,
2006/2007), venture characteristics (Fiet, 1995; Nagy & Obenberger, 1994; Ueda, 2004),
investor characteristics and preferences (Khanin, Baum, Turel, & Mahto, 2009; Khanin & Turel,
2012; Mahto, Ahluwalia, & Walsh, 2018), characteristics market characteristics (Fiet, 1995;
Fried & Hisrich, 1994), the entrepreneur’s social network (Shane & Cable, 2002; Shane &
Stuart, 2002), the business model/plan (Galbraith, et al., 2009), as well as capital structure and
financing types (Cassar, 2004; Heuven & Groen, 2012). However, these characteristics only
provide a partial picture of the investment decision.
Another prominent area of research that has been applied to investment decisions is the
judgment and decision making literature related to cognitive heuristics. Heuristics, or biases, are
miscalculated judgments that often result in decision making that is less than optimal (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974). Indeed, early stage investors often rely on subjective criteria or “gut” feelings
when making decisions (Aernoudt, 1999; Baty & Sommer, 2002; Morisette, 2007). Multiple
types of heuristics influence decision making by distorting information that is used in decision
processing. While several venture characteristics are known to influence funding decisions,
heuristics also play an important role in entrepreneurial investment decision making - an area of
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the literature where our understanding of how entrepreneur’s and investor’s negotiation behavior
affects this process is incomplete (Harrison, Mason, & Smith, 2015; Shepherd, Williams, &
Patzelt, 2015). Indeed, Zider (1995) estimated that one type of entrepreneurial investor, VCs,
only spend about 5% of their time negotiating on investments. Despite the small amount of time
spent on this activity, it is nonetheless a crucial activity for both parties.
To explore this area, we seek to gain insight into how cognitive heuristics, specifically
those regarding technology, impact the negotiation between entrepreneurs and venture investors.
Specifically, we propose that technology will have a significant effect on how both entrepreneurs
and investors process information during funding negotiations, as well as on the outcomes of
those negotiations. To accomplish this, we utilized a laboratory study using business students
from two major universities across the United States between 2016 and 2017. The approach
allows us the control necessary to pinpoint the effects of technology on negotiations and test our
hypotheses. Using a controlled laboratory setting, we find a significant technology bias in
negotiations. We find that techno-optimism influences both value perceptions and higher
negotiation outcomes for entrepreneurs with value partially mediating the relationship.
Our study makes three primary contributions. First, we contribute to the venture funding
literature by further examining the relationship between entrepreneur and investor negotiations.
To date, much of this literature focuses on the value proposition delivered to investors in the way
of a business’ potential projected success (Payne, Davis, Moore, & Bell, 2009). There is a void
in the literature however, with regard to the effect of the negotiations between the parties. By
examining the negotiations and their outcomes, this research adds an important element to our
understanding of the capital acquisition process. Second, we add to the literature about cognition
in decision making and the common judgment biases influencing decision makers by exploring
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perceptual distortions in the context of financial acquisition. Specifically, we explore the role
technology plays at influencing judgments about perceived venture value and the corresponding
negotiations entrepreneurs engage in to acquire capital. Recent research has shown that
technology invokes over-optimism (Clark, Robert, & Hampton, 2016). However, the literature
has not tested this effect in specific business contexts, nor the specific mechanisms that explain
how this over-optimism is actually demonstrated. Thus, we extend the decision making and
judgement heuristics literature by further exploring the role technology plays on over-optimism,
as well as exploring this phenomenon in an entrepreneurial financing context. Third, we
contribute to the technology and innovation literature by exploring how perceptions impact
negotiated outcomes regarding financing. Perceptions of technology have implications for both
entrepreneurs and investors as well as researchers studying the effects of technology in decision
making.
2. Theory and Hypotheses
2.1 Technology Bias in Decision Making
Entrepreneurial financing, at its core, involves individuals providing funds (investors)
and individuals seeking funds (entrepreneurs) to reach an agreement about the terms of
financing. To negotiate such a contract requires both parties to present information to the other
side and to process the information that they receive. The heuristic-systematic model (Chaiken,
1980) suggests that such decisions are likely to be made in one of two ways: a high-effort and
highly systematic process or a faster, more automatic (heuristic) route that bypasses extensive
effort and processing. While important decisions such as investing may motivate focused logical
judgements about the potential of investment in a venture (Kumar & Goyal, 2016), or what
Chaiken refers to as systematic processing, an abundance of evidence suggests this is often not
7

the case (e.g. Poteshman & Serbin, 2003; Stroe, Parida, & Wincent, 2018). When decision
makers are in situations that have at least some familiar elements, they often opt for heuristic
processing because the familiar elements are taken as information that can be leveraged as a
cognitive short cut. This processing often contradicts economic rationality. Nonetheless, the
entrepreneurial literature is teeming with examples of how investors defer to more subjective
criteria of intuition to make decisions when evaluating ventures (Aernoudt, 1999; Baty &
Sommer, 2002; Morisette, 2007). Much of the evidence of such “irrational” decisions is rooted in
work by Tversky and Kahneman (1973), which has established that individuals often apply
judgmental heuristics to decisions as a result of limited ability or willingness to process
information systematically.
One example, where the availability heuristic and salience bias operate within an
increasingly important context, is the “technology effect”, which consists of a learned tendency
to be overly optimistic about technology and its ability to solve problems and create value
(Clark, Robert, & Hampton, 2016). Indeed, technology often seems to be celebrated above all
else (Feenberg, 1991) leading to biases towards technology for both novices and experts alike
(Elsbach & Stigliani, 2019). The irrational buildup leading to the .com bubble exemplifies this
(Saade, 2015). Furthermore, perceptions of technology have been found to impact several
phenomena such as learning modes (Linton & Walsch, 2013), investment (Lockett, Murray, &
Wright, 2002; Lowe & Ziedonis, 2006), and attitudes (Mordini, 2007; Moynihan & Lavertu,
2012).
The technology effect suggests that individuals implicitly associate technology with
success and are thus biased in their perceptions about the benefits of technology Clark, Robert, &
Hampton, 2016). Such implicit associations have been shown to be powerful determinants of
8

cognition and behaviors (Greenwald et al. 2009) and are leveraged in fast heuristic mental
processes. The result is overconfidence in the merits of technology – especially in instances
where there is uncertainty about a technology or an emerging technological industry as is typical
for a technology venture. A lack of concrete data or an established track record creates an
environment where systematic processing is less likely and heuristic processing more likely
(Chaiken, 1980). In short, optimism about a new venture’s prospects is likely to permeate the
thinking and behaviors of both the entrepreneur and their business partners. Due to excessive
techno-optimism on both sides of the negotiation table, we expect better negotiated outcomes for
technology entrepreneurs compared to similar (equally promising) low-technology
entrepreneurs.

Hypothesis 1: Technology entrepreneurs will negotiate more successfully with investors
compared to non-technology entrepreneurs, ceteris paribus.

While previous research has demonstrated that technology is generally associated with
success (even amongst industry experts) (Tichy, 2004), it is not entirely clear what the
mechanisms are that connect technology as a concept with perceptions of future behaviors or
positive outcomes. One possible mechanism for this is individual over-optimism towards
technology (Clark, Robert, & Hampton, 2016; Feenberg, 1991). In the context of negotiations for
start-up financing, we suspect that technology-infused startups will be perceived as having more
valuable products and services than low technology startups even when verifying evidence is
lacking, thus manifesting as a form of irrational over-optimism. Further, over-optimism about
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startup technologies will drive perceptions of value in at least two ways. First the technology bias
will be displayed in entrepreneur-investor negotiations in part due to what is referred to as the
availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). This phenomenon occurs when decisions are
made as a result of the ease with which individuals are able to recall information. A major factor
increasing the ease with which information is recalled has to do with how much information is
received and the intensity or vividness of that information (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Common
examples of vivid information are stories published in media reports; with such stories impacting
various decisions from consumer purchasing (Cornelissen, Pandelaere, & Warlop, 2008), to
ethical decision making (Hayibor & Wasieleski, 2009) to stock market investments (Kliger &
Kudryavtsev, 2010). Thus, we see a disproportionate number of reports of technology successes
relative to failures (Golder & Tellis, 1993). This unbalanced exposure to relevant information
causes us to believe that technology creates more value than it actually does and is more likely to
succeed than it actually is.
Second, the salience bias also drives techno-optimism. Salient events are easier to recall
because they are the events that are more dramatic (Hossain & Morgan, 2006) or relevant
because they change the status quo (John, Acquisti, & Loewenstein, 2009). Due to a general
reluctance to publicize technology failures (Levinthal & March, 1993; McGrath, 1999) and a
natural tendency to pay attention to successes, we overvalue contexts characterized by
technology. As an example, consider the enthusiasm amongst media and consumers every time a
new version of the iPhone is released by Apple, Inc. Additionally, we are captivated by stories of
recent (e.g. Snapchat) and historic (e.g. (Apple’s Mac) successes and tend to forget failures (e.g.
Apple’s iTunes Ping). These stories offer and reinforce reference points which influence
perceptions during negotiations (Bottom, 1998; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). According to the
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availability and salience heuristics, the vividness, relevance, and ease of recalling those stories
make individuals less likely to process conflicting information and instead rely on judgmental
heuristics. This leads us to suggest that both entrepreneurs and the investors will experience
some degree of techno-optimism, leading them to perceive more value with a technology related
venture than a non-technology related venture.

Hypothesis 2a: Entrepreneurs will overvalue technology products relative to non-technology
products.
Hypothesis 2b: Investors will overvalue technology products relative to non-technology
products.

Perceived value is a pivotal factor in entrepreneurial negotiation as discrepancies often
exist between the perceptions of entrepreneurs and investors (Artinger, Vulkan, & Shem-Tov,
2015). Following the arguments of the technology bias (Clark, Robert, & Hampton, 2016;
Elsbach & Stigliani, 2019; Feenberg, 1991; Saade, 2015), placing a more optimistic value on
technology than on non-technology should lead to greater negotiation leverage for technology
entrepreneurs relative to their non-technology counterparts. For example, Kristensen and Garling
(1997) found that value estimates strongly influence each negotiator’s reservation price, or the
lowest acceptable outcome (Blount et al. 1996), and that these cutoff points rise and fall in
reaction to new information and new cognitive evaluation. Basic negotiation mechanics prescribe
that higher reservation prices lead to higher negotiation outcomes (Huber & Neale, 1986; White
& Neale, 1994).
11

Additionally, in an effort to remain consistent with perceptions of the value of a venture,
we suggest that the higher value placed on technology ventures will impact the degree to which
technology entrepreneurs succeed in achieving positive negotiation outcomes with investors.
This assertion is supported by further evidence in the cognitive decision making literature –
specifically what is referred to as the confirmation bias (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982).
This bias results from an individual’s desire to avoid dissonant behavior (Jonas, Schulz-Hardt,
Frey, & Thelen, 2001), thus promoting behavior that is consistent with previous perceptions. In
the case of the entrepreneur-investor negotiation, the more value the investor and entrepreneur
perceive in technology, the more they will act on those perceptions; thereby improving the
technology entrepreneurs negotiating position. Therefore, we expect the relationship between
technology and negotiation outcomes will operate via the higher perceived value of the
technology related ventures.

Hypothesis 3a: The entrepreneur’s value perception of the new venture will be positively related
to the entrepreneur’s negotiated outcome.
Hypothesis 3b: Investor’s value perception of the new venture will be positively related to the
entrepreneur’s negotiated outcome.

As prior literature suggests, many factors, such as feelings about the negotiation process
or outcomes (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006), perceptions of fairness (Colquitt, Conlon,
Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001), and personal assessment of self-worth (White, Tynan, Galinsky, &
Thompson, 2004) influence the perception of value and consequently negotiated outcomes
12

(Caputo, 2013). Therefore, we expect that perceived value is just one factor which may mediate
the relationship between the presence of technology and negotiated outcomes. In other words,
technology makes us optimistic about outcomes, in part due to higher product valuations (Clark,
Robert, & Hampton, 2016; Elsbach & Stigliani, 2019). Since technology is a specialized and
often complicated area (Farrukh, Phaal, & Probert, 2003), it is likely that the information
asymmetry gap would be large and would favor the entrepreneur. Information asymmetry
(Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973) is common in many venture financing decisions and is a known
driver of negotiation outcomes (Fisher, Frederickson, & Peffer, 2002; Scholes, Wright,
Westhead, Burrows, & Bruining, 2007). Therefore, without appropriate signals to offer
information and lessen the information gap (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011),
investors are left to make decisions via the heuristic processing route, often based on “gut”
feelings and intuition (Aernoudt, 1999; Baty & Sommer, 2002; Morisette, 2007).
In negotiations, the party who possess more information than their counterpart tends to
experience better outcomes (Rackham, 1999). Thus, the information asymmetry, which
technology often presents (Gharbi, Sahut, & Teulon, 2014), should strengthen the technology
entrepreneur’s position, conversely weakening the position of investors, leading to more
favorable outcomes for the entrepreneur. Indeed, Balakrishnan and Koza (1993) found that
investors typically have less information about a venture than the entrepreneur, and the resultant
uncertainty impacts financing decisions in their favor. Therefore, we expect technology
entrepreneurs to achieve greater negotiation success than their non-technology counterparts for
multiple reasons, one of which is techno-optimism. Yet, because information asymmetry, and
potentially other mechanisms, do not operate through perceived value, we predict that while
perceived value will mediate the technology – outcome relationship, it will only do so partially.
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Hypothesis 4: The relationship between technology and higher negotiated outcomes for
entrepreneurs will be partially mediated by the higher value placed on technology products
relative to non-technology products.

Taken together, our hypotheses argue that the presence of technology directly impacts
negotiated outcomes between entrepreneurs and investors. Furthermore, technology is directly
related to perceived value, a result of the overoptimistic biases technology promotes.
Consequently, perceived value is also directly related to negotiation outcomes between
entrepreneurs and investors. Thus, perceived value mediates, at least partially, the relationship
between technology and negotiation outcomes. These hypothesized relationships are shown in
Figure 1, with H1, H2, and H3 labelled specifically, and H4 pertaining to the collection of
relationships.
-------------------Insert Figure 1 about here
------------------3. Method
3.1 Participants and Procedure
To assess the impact of the concept of technology on negotiations we used a laboratory
experiment approach following the recommendations outlined in Hsu, Simmons, and Wieland
(2016). Using 212 business school students (56% male, 79% undergraduates) across two large
14

public U.S. Universities (one in the Southeast and one in the West) we collected data from 106
negotiations. They were recruited through an offering of course credit for their participation.
This approach follows previous work using students to assess decision making in entrepreneurial
contexts (e.g. Chen, Yao, & Kotha, 2009; Davis & Peake, 2014; Sapienza & Korsgaard, 1996).
Two negotiation dyads failed the manipulation check (failed to correctly identify the industry of
the start-up) and one dyad did not finish the negotiation exercise, resulting in 103 usable data
points. A single administrator conducted each session in order to ensure consistency across the
sample. Roughly half of the negotiation dyads (52%) involved a scenario where a technology
entrepreneur negotiates funding, ownership, and control terms with a VC. The other half did so
for a non-technology start up. Following Clark and colleagues (Clark, Robert & Hampton, 2016),
we selected Medical Devices as a high-technology context and Restaurants as a low-technology
context. Some advantages of this choice are that the two industries were found to have
comparable ratings for general importance, benefit to society, integrity, and ethical approval,
thus ruling out potential reputation effects. Further, they found past financial returns in these
industries to be comparable (Clark, et al., 2016). Importantly, respondents rated these industries
as very high and very low on the range of how technology oriented they are. Examples of
materials are available in Appendix A.
Participants were assigned to the role of entrepreneur or VC in the high- or lowtechnology context. We chose VCs in the role of the entrepreneurial investor as they are a salient
and highly studied provider of early stage financing. By definition, VCs are professional
investors who strive to identify, invest, and then profitably exit high growth high return ventures
in need of equity injections (Burgelman & Hitt, 2007; De Clercq, Fried, Lehtonen, & Sapienza,
2006; Sohl, 2003). In each role, participants were given instructions for their negotiation task,
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followed by a brief questionnaire to collect demographics and assess product value perceptions
of their assigned condition. They were also provided a description of the startup company that
included projected future firm performance that was identical across conditions. They then
completed the negotiation, followed by a brief questionnaire to collect the negotiated outcomes
and a manipulation check.
3.2 Dependent Variable
Entrepreneurs and VCs were provided confidential score tables that equate negotiated
terms to point amounts (see Appendix A). We measured negotiation score as the aggregate score
of the entrepreneur across the three outcome elements: amount of capital, ownership, and
control. Each of these measurements are commonly used when examining entrepreneurial
success (capital (e.g. Ko & McKelvie, forthcoming), ownership (e.g. Vismara, 2016), and control
(e.g. Gompers, 1995)). All three of these variables, to a greater or lesser extent, factor into
entrepreneurial decision making (Shepherd, Williams, & Patzelt, 2015).
An aggregated scoring table – such as that we used here in our study – is a common
means of measuring performance in negotiation research (e.g. Carnevale & De Dreu, 2005).
Central to this approach is enhancing control over the study in order to avoid potentially spurious
effects. The use of multiple outcomes with different scores allotted for various levels of the
outcome is common practice in laboratory negotiation research, as it allows for parties to identify
differences in preference for certain outcomes. This creates the ability for parties to engage in
logrolling, whereby parties can trade low preference outcomes for ones that are of higher
importance. Utilizing this method also helps to avoid the perception of a negotiation being a
zero-sum endeavor. Moreover, aggregating subjects’ scores for the three outcomes allows for a

16

more accurate assessment of performance, in general, and has been used in multiple contexts
(e.g. Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Pruitt, 1981; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975).
3.3 Independent Variable
Following prior entrepreneurship research (e.g. Mason & Harrison, 2004), technology
was manipulated in half of our sample through our descriptions of the startup company.
Participants negotiated terms either for a medical devices (tech = 1) or a restaurant consulting
company (tech = 0). In both cases, negotiation materials stated five-year revenue estimates that
were identical across the technology (medical devices) and non-technology (restaurant
consulting) conditions. Thus, if participants considered the startup to have a promising versus
bleak outlook, it would be attributable to their perceptions based on their mental model of
imagined expectations rather than the stated factual outlook. Further, the technology and nontechnology industries are comparable across a number of reputation and financial performance
metrics (Clark et al., 2016).
3.4 Mediating Variable
We hypothesized that in a negotiation context, techno-optimism is likely to operate
through perceptions of product value. We measured product value through the pre-negotiation
questions, “How much value do you think your product has?” and “How much value do you
think the company's product has?” for the entrepreneur and VC, respectively. Responses were on
a seven-point Likert scale ranging from extremely low (1) to extremely high (7).
3.5 Control Variables
Participant gender (male = 1; female = 0) was used as a covariate in our analysis as past
research has shown gender differences in negotiation outcomes (Mazei, Hüffmeier, Freund,
17

Stuhlmacher, Bilke, & Hertel, 2015; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999) as well as over-optimism
(e.g. Barber & Odean, 2001) and general risk taking (Byrnes et al., 1999). We also controlled
for graduate student status (graduate = 1; undergraduate = 0) and self-perception of negotiation
skill on a seven point Likert scale (1 = extremely low; 7 = extremely high) with the question,
“How confident are you in your negotiation skill?” We control for these factors as one’s
perception of experience and skill has been shown to affect entrepreneurial decision making
(Zacharakis & Shepherd, 2001).
4. Results
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics and correlations. Consistent with prior negotiations
research, perception of negotiation skill was positively correlated with one’s own negotiated
outcome while the negotiation skill of the opponent is negatively correlated with one’s
negotiated outcome (Maddux, Mullen, & Galinsky, 2008; Weingart, Thompson, Bazerman, &
Carroll, 1990). We also observed positive correlations between the high technology condition
and perceptions of product value, for both the entrepreneur and the VC. Interestingly, VC’s
perceived negotiation skill was negatively correlated with the technology condition. Neither
gender nor graduate status were correlated with any other variables.
-------------------Insert Table 1 about here
------------------We predicted in hypothesis 1 that the general concept of technology, when invoked in a
capital negotiation context would trigger more successful outcomes for the negotiating
entrepreneur. This was supported (β = 1103.99, p = 0.000) in our results as displayed in Model 2
18

of Table 2. Post hoc predictive margins show that a typical technology entrepreneur would
expect to achieve a 12% higher total negotiation score than a comparable non-technology
entrepreneur (10,158 to 9,054; scores are a combination of capital, equity, and control
agreements). This finding provides theoretical support that individuals have an implicit bias
which favors technology over non-technology.
-------------------Insert Table 2 about here
------------------In hypothesis 2, we predicted a specific mechanism whereby technology, and its
attendant, techno-optimism, will influence the cognitions and eventually the behavior of both
entrepreneurs and VCs. We asserted and found that, indeed, both sides of the negotiating table
perceived the value of a new technology startup’s product to be higher than that of a new lowtechnology startup’s product, despite being provided identical figures regarding expected firm
performance across conditions. While entrepreneurs placed a higher value on their firm’s
products than did the VCs, both entrepreneurs (β = 0.77, p = 0.000) and VCs (β = 0.65, p =
0.002) valued technology products about 13% more highly than low-technology products (see
Models 8 and 10 of Table 3). These findings extend literature related to availability of
information, and how the ability to easily recall technological successes, make investors prone to
becoming overly optimistic in the value technology will create. These results are displayed in
Figure 2 in the form of post hoc predictive margins.
-------------------Insert Table 3 about here
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-------------------------------------Insert Figure 2 about here
-------------------

Continuing along the logical progression of our partial mediation model, we also
predicted that perceptions of product value, both of the entrepreneur (Model 3) and the VC
(Model 4) would influence the negotiation success of the entrepreneur. Results in the affirmative
are seen in Table 2, both for the entrepreneurs (β = 273.55, p = 0.048) and the VCs (β = 403.15,
p = 0.002). To better grasp the relative importance of the influence of the perceptions of the
entrepreneur versus the VC, we also tested them jointly (Model 5), finding that the VC’s value
perception (β = 359.93, p = 0.007) is a better predictor of the negotiated outcome than is the
entrepreneur’s value perception (β = 175.05, p = 0.204).
Finally, in Hypothesis 4 we sought to determine whether and to what extent the effect of
technology on negotiated outcomes operates through the mediating effect of product value
perceptions. We found (Model 6) that VC perceptions of product value partially mediated the
influence of technology on negotiated outcomes (β = 266.84, p = 0.039), but entrepreneur value
perceptions did not (β = 31.14, p = 0.822). As hypothesized, the effect is one of partial mediation
only, as technology maintained a strong independent influence (β = 907.21, p = 0.002) on
negotiated outcomes even with the inclusion of value perceptions as mediating variables.
5. Discussion
This study was designed to build on our understanding of the pivotal stage of securing
startup funding. In doing so, we contribute to the literature in venture funding (e.g. Eckhardt,
20

Shane, & Delmar, 2006; Lagazio & Querci, 2018), biases in decision making (e.g. Poteshman &
Serbin, 2003; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), and perceptions of technology (e.g. Clark, Robert, &
Hampton, 2016; Elsbach & Stigliani, 2019) in negotiations between entrepreneurs and investors.
To accomplish this, we leveraged theory regarding cognitive heuristics and biases in decision
making (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), and specifically
heuristics related to over optimism about technology (Clark, Robert, & Hampton, 2016; Elsbach
& Stigliani, 2019), to make predictions about the effect of technology on startup capital success.
We tested our predictions in a setting which is inexorably related to capital acquisition, but one
which lacks empirical understanding of its complexity – entrepreneur-investor negotiations.
In support of the predicted relationship between technology and startup capital
acquisition, technology entrepreneurs negotiated more successful investment contracts for their
startups. Techno-optimism was prevalent by both negotiation parties, leading to higher amount
of capital negotiated, percent ownership retained, and control over decision making. Extending
prior research on heuristics in decision making (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974), our results support the suggestion that technology influences the cognitive
processes involved in negotiation for start-up capital. As evidenced by popular press and media
attention given to technology firms and products (Golder & Tellis, 1993), the technology effect
creates an implicit bias (Clark, Robert, & Hampton, 2016; Elsbach & Stigliani, 2019), whereby
successes in the technology sector are made salient through exposure. Specifically, in the context
of entrepreneur-investor negotiations, these findings suggest that the judgments of investors are
influenced by this heuristic. Assuming these conditions are favorable for entrepreneurs seeking
funding, these results suggest that technology entrepreneurs, when compared to their nontechnology counterparts, have an automatic benefit in negotiating with investors for funding.
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Consistent with past work on investment decisions, we found that multiple mechanisms
contributed to improved negotiation outcomes for technology entrepreneurs (Wang, Qureshi,
Deeds, & Ren, 2019). In support of our predictions, both the entrepreneurs and the investors in
the technology condition perceived the venture to have more value than in the non-technology
condition, despite identical information about projected value being provided in both conditions.
In a similar manner to the societal enthusiasm awarded to technology successes, our results
suggest that technology entrepreneurs as well as the investors with whom they negotiate for
startup funding award technology firms as being more valuable than non-technology
entrepreneurs and their investors. We build on an expanse of past research (e.g. Caputo, 2013)
which shows that the cognitive processes significantly influence the negotiation process. One
particularly interesting aspect of our results, is that the overoptimism in technology is
experienced in more powerfully by the investor. Technology does influence the entrepreneur to
perceive their product to be more valuable than an entrepreneur who is not involved with
technology, but the investor is even more prone to this irrational evaluation of value.
As we expected, perceived value of a venture was also indicative of capital negotiation
success. Specifically, ventures that were perceived by entrepreneurs and investors as possessing
greater value negotiated for higher amounts of capital, a greater percentage of ownership, and
more decision making control. This finding adds to the literature on perceptions in negotiations
(e.g. Artinger, Vulkan, & Shem-Tov, 2015). Furthermore, considering these sequential
relationships simultaneously, results from our study show that entrepreneur and investor over
valuation of the worth of technological products mediates the relationship between venture type
and negotiated capital acquisition specifics.
5.1 Theoretical Contributions
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Our analyses have several important theoretical implications. By demonstrating the
relevance of the technology effect in a new and important context – entrepreneur-investor
negotiations, we contribute to the existing literature in several areas. We add to the judgmental
heuristics literature (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) in an
important way, by examining the role technology plays on distorting perceptions in decision
making. To our knowledge, we are the first to directly test this phenomenon in the negotiation of
capital. Thus, we add to what Clark et al. (2017) have labeled the technology effect and
contribute to the increasing evidence that technology plays in perceptions (Elsbach & Stigliani,
2019). We also expand those literatures into the context of entrepreneurial financing, by
examining the role technology has on influencing decision making within that transaction.
Indeed, while the negotiation of financing is a key step in an entrepreneurial ventures growth,
how perceptions impact this process has received limited attention in the literature (e.g. Anglin et
al. 2018; Balakrishnan & Koza, 1993).
Integrating these perspectives, we extend our understanding of the technology effect and
our understanding of its boundary conditions. Specifically, we explore one specific mechanism –
perceptions of venture value – from the perspectives of both the entrepreneur and the investor.
To that end, we find that the technology effect operates mainly through the investor rather than
the entrepreneur in such a negotiation. However, we observe only partial mediation, so the
technology effect operates either directly or through other (still unknown) mediators. Therefore,
we bring together several literatures including venture funding (e.g. Eckhardt, Shane, & Delmar,
2006; Lagazio & Querci, 2018), biases in decision making (e.g. Poteshman & Serbin, 2003;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), and perceptions of technology (e.g. Clark, Robert, & Hampton,
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2016; Elsbach & Stigliani, 2019), to explore the intersection of the technology effect and
perceptions of value in entrepreneurial negotiating success.
5.2 Practical Implications
Not surprisingly, entrepreneurs are exceedingly optimistic about their own company
(Bolger, Pulford, & Colman, 2008; Camerer & Lovallo, 1999). This is akin to the view that
entrepreneurs have “rose colored glasses” about their ideas and capabilities (Simon, Houghton,
& Aquino, 2000). Alternatively, this effect may, or may not, be due to the tech effect as the tech
effect is strongest when decision makers lack familiarity with the technology. Thus, it is
reasonable to see investors demonstrate techno-optimism – which is indeed what we see in our
data. The implication is that investors need to familiarize themselves more thoroughly in order to
achieve more favorable (and rational) negotiation outcomes. This is particularly true as our
analyses indicate that the mediation occurs primarily through the investor rather than through the
entrepreneur. At the same time, it is important for investors to understand that this irrational
optimism toward technology occurs unconsciously, and that efforts should be made to question
whether technology prospects are influencing value projections. Studies show (e.g. Thompson,
Nadler, & Lount, 2000) that the primary means to overcoming such miscalculations is to make
oneself aware of them. Thus, if investors are aware that techno-optimistic evaluations may be
occurring, they may be able to become more consciously aware of how they are making
valuations
While the data here may heed caution to investors, they offer implications for
entrepreneurs that can be leveraged. The success of entrepreneurial startups can be dependent
upon the ability to acquire external financing. The findings from our experimental study suggest
that technology entrepreneurs can leverage the technology effect to highlight the value of said
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technology to the investors they are negotiating with for capital. Conversely, it is just as
important for entrepreneurs to understand the unconscious nature of this technology heuristic. If
an entrepreneur enters negotiations for startup capital with blinders of overly inflated perception
of the value of technology, he or she may underestimate the importance of other planning
activities and more objective value criteria. Thus, as others have suggested, cognitive and
situational awareness will improve performance for technology entrepreneurs (Cohendet &
Pawlak, 2009). While, as our analyses suggests, it may be difficult to overcome these biases,
entrepreneurs need to shore up other aspects of their venture (e.g. human capital, financials,
market demand, etc.) without relying on technology to be a universal panacea to gain funding.
In other words, while technology is a great asset to have, entrepreneurs seeking funding should
have shored up other areas of potential weakness within their ventures, so that they do not need
to overly rely on technology.
5.3 Future Research Opportunities
According to our analyses, the observed partial mediation suggests the technology effect
also influences outcomes directly and/or through still unidentified mediators. Therefore, future
research should explore other possible paths through which the technology effect has either
direct or indirect influence over entrepreneurs and investors. For example, does the perception of
technology impact the willingness of potential entrepreneurs to pursue entrepreneurship? Pursue
financing (or even types of financing)? Additionally, perceptions of dependence (e.g. Ganesan,
1994) or culture factors (e.g. Cannon, Doney, Mullen, & Petersen, 2010) are a few other possible
potential mediators for future researcher to unpack and explore.
Now that we know that it is possible for the technology effect to surface, knowingly or
unknowingly, during negotiations, future work should determine which real-world settings this
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does and does not generalize to. While we simulated a negotiation between an entrepreneur and
an investor, future research needs to confirm our findings using actual entrepreneurs and
investors (versus students playing such roles). Future research could also explore other nuances
in the effect of the technology effect in the negotiations between entrepreneurs and venture
investors, such as whether this effect is consistent amongst differing investors (e.g. angel
investors (Wetzel, 1983) or crowdfunders (Mollick, 2014)) as well as broader contexts both
within and beyond entrepreneurship (e.g. Does this effect hold in M&A deals (Das & Kapil,
2012), corporate governance (Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003), etc.?). Furthermore, as
technology is a broad area, do certain types of technology (e.g. biomedical, telecommunications,
etc.) have differing effects on negotiations? Would differing effects be a function of the investors
reviewing the project?
6. Conclusion
We predict and find that there is indeed a significant technology effect in entrepreneurinvestor negotiations. Specifically, we test our conjectures using a controlled experimental
context simulating negotiations between entrepreneurs and investors. We find that the impact of
the technology effect influences not only negotiation success, but also that both parties’
perceptions of the venture valuation being negotiated. We further find that these perceptions
influence negotiation success, but while seemingly sequentially related, we were surprised to
find that they are not strong mediators in the relationship between the technology effect and
negotiation success. Our analyses offer some preliminary insights into the manner and magnitude
of the impact of the technology effect on negotiations. Consequently, our findings have both
practical and theoretical implications for both those engaging in such negotiations and those
studying such negotiations.
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TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations

Variables
1 Technology
2 Gender of Ent
3 Gender of VC
4 Graduate Student
5 Value Perception of Ent
6 Value Perception of VC
7 Negotiation Skill of Ent
8 Negotiation Skill of VC

Mean
0.53
0.56
0.53
0.20
6.23
5.28
5.24
5.37

SD
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.40
0.99
1.03
1.35
1.23

1

2

3

-0.04
-0.21
0.13
0.42
0.29
0.17
-0.20

0.28
-0.14
0.03
-0.04
0.13
-0.04

-0.11
-0.06
-0.10
0.01
0.15

4

5

6

7

0.12
-0.14
0.02
-0.07

0.24
0.16
-0.15

0.05
-0.01

-0.10

Note: Technology = 1 for high-tech condition and 0 for low-tech; Gender = 1 for male and 0 for female;
Correlations of 0.20 or greater are significant at p < .05

Table 2

Negotiatied Outcomes (of the Entrepreneur) Regressions (H1, H3, and H4)
Controls

Variables
Technology

Model 1

Gender of Ent

-135.38
(284.20)
-171.65
(281.99)
71.26
(334.95)

Gender of VC
Graduate Student

H1

H3

Model 2
1103.99 ***
(259.93)
-134.23
(262.11)
23.96
(264.12)
-68.48
(310.66)

Value Perception of Ent
Value Perception of VC
Negotiation Skill of Ent
Negotiation Skill of VC
Constant

N
R²

315.68 **
(100.55)
-411.93 ***
(111.14)
10353.66 ***
(847.82)
103
0.22

251.83 **
(93.94)
-346.25 **
(103.66)
9669.65 ***
(798.34)
103
0.35

Model 3

-152.18
(280.02)
-153.11
(277.88)
-5.02
(332.08)
273.55 *
(136.73)

Model 4

-99.39
(271.79)
-80.33
(270.96)
232.68
(324.01)

403.15 **
(126.00)
286.38 **
297.54 **
(100.10)
(96.24)
-384.81 *** -413.28 ***
(110.30)
(106.20)
8671.77 *** 8224.82 ***
(1184.91)
(1048.34)
103
103
0.26
0.30

H4
Model 5

-114.00
(271.14)
-78.25
(270.07)
166.57
(327.06)
175.05
(136.93)
359.93 **
(130.06)
280.74 **
(96.82)
-395.78 ***
(106.73)
7376.71 ***
(1237.70)
103
0.31

Model 6
907.21 **
(284.56)
-112.52
(258.94)
51.65
(261.12)
54.60
(314.31)
31.14
(138.34)
266.84 *
(127.59)
247.87 **
(93.04)
-355.77 ***
(102.70)
8191.05 ***
(1209.29)
103
0.38

Note: Technology = 1 for high-tech condition and 0 for low-tech; Gender = 1 for male and 0 for female; Standard errors in parentheses;
†p <.1
*p < .05
**p < .01
***p < .001
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Table 3

Value Perception Regressions (H2)
Controls: Ent

Variables
Technology
Gender of Ent
Gender of VC
Graduate Student
Negotiation Skill of Ent
Negotiation Skill of VC
Constant

N
R²

Model 7

0.06
(0.21)
-0.07
(0.21)
0.28
(0.24)
0.11
(0.07)
-0.10
(0.08)
6.15 ***
(0.62)
103
0.06

H2: Ent
Model 8
0.77 ***
(0.19)
0.06
(0.19)
0.07
(0.19)
0.18
(0.23)
0.06
(0.07)
-0.05
(0.08)
5.67 ***
(0.59)
103
0.35

Controls: VC
Model 9

-0.09
(0.22)
-0.23
(0.22)
-0.40
(0.26)
0.04
(0.08)
0.00
(0.09)
5.28 ***
(0.65)
103
0.04

H2: VC
Model 10
0.65 **
(0.21)
-0.09
(0.21)
-0.11
(0.21)
-0.48 †
(0.25)
0.01
(0.08)
0.04
(0.08)
4.88 ***
(0.64)
103
0.13

Note: Technology = 1 for high-tech condition and 0 for low-tech; Gender = 1 for male and 0 for female;
Standard errors in parentheses
†p <.1
*p < .05
**p < .01
***p < .001
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Fig. 1

Partial Mediation Model of Technology's Impact on Venture Finance Negotiations
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APPENDIX A

MedTech, Inc.

Background
You are an entrepreneur who recently founded MedTech, Inc., a U.S.-based medical technology
company that specializes in medical devices. After receiving your MBA, you started working on
a prototype of a new nanorobot that will improve numerous medical procedures and treatments.
You are in the final stages of creating the prototype and are now ready to start producing it for
commercial use. You have pitched the idea to medical doctors and believe there will be enough
demand for the product to justify mass-production. In order to begin production, you require
significant outside capital.
You have scheduled to meet with an associate at Divvy Out Capital, to negotiate for the seed
money to get you started. To prepare for your meeting, you have done some market analysis to
produce the following estimates:
You estimate revenues the first 5 years to be:
Year 1 = - $100,000
Year 2 = $100,000
Year 3 = $250,000
Year 4 = $1,000,000
Year 5 = $2,000,000

You have learned that negotiating over multiple issues is the best way to achieve a favorable
outcome. Thus, you have determined that the following matters should be considered:
1. Amount of Capital
2. Percentage of Ownership Retained
3. Amount of Control you will have on decision making (i.e. how “hands-off” the VC
will be)

Negotiation
You will notice that issues differ in point values. You have determined that most important to
you is getting the necessary capital, since you are confident that once up and running, the product
will be successful. You are not as concerned about the ownership you retain or the control over
decision making, but achieving a favorable outcome is still important. You want to achieve the
best outcome you can, but realize you are dependent upon this outside capital in order to pursue
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this venture. Therefore, you are motivated to reach an agreement with this venture capital
company.
Confidential Success Table for MedTech, Inc.

Issue
Amount of Capital

Terms in Contract
$1,500,000
$1,250,000
$1,000,000
$750,000
$500,000

Points
6000
5000
4000
2000
1000

Ownership Retained
(MedTech)

80%
60%
50%
40%
35%

4000
3500
2500
2000
1500

Amount of Control

MedTech, Inc.
5
4
3
2
1
Divvy Out Capital

4000
3000
2500
2000
1500
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Divvy Out Capital

Background
You are as associate at Divvy Out Capital, a venture capital firm who invests in new ventures.
You are meeting with the founder of MedTech, Inc., a technology company that specializes in
medical devices. You know that the founder, who recently completed an MBA, is in the final
stages of creating the prototype of a new nanorobot that will improve numerous medical
procedures and treatments, and is ready to start producing it on a larger scale.
You have scheduled to meet with the founder of MedTech, to decide whether Divvy Out will
provide venture capital. In preparation of the meeting, MedTech offered the following
performance estimates, which seem realistic.
Estimated revenues for MedTech for the first 5 years:
Year 1 = - $100,000
Year 2 = $100,000
Year 3 = $250,000
Year 4 = $1,000,000
Year 5 = $2,000,000

You know that in addition to determining whether and how much capital to invest, that you will
also be determining matters of ownership and decision making control.
Issues to consider
1. Amount of Capital
2. Percentage of Ownership Retained by MedTech
3. Amount of Control you will have on decision making (i.e. how “hands-on” Divvy
Out will be)

Negotiation
You will notice that issues differ in point values. You have determined that the most important
issues to you are the amount of capital you will agree to pay and the amount of ownership you
will secure. You are less concerned about control over decision making, but realize it is wise if
you have some oversight of those processes. You want to achieve the best outcome you can, but
realize there is tremendous potential upside in this venture. Therefore, you are motivated to reach
an agreement with MedTech.
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Confidential Success Table for Divvy Out Capital

Issue
Amount of Capital

Terms in Contract
$1,500,000
$1,250,000
$1,000,000
$750,000
$500,000

Points
1000
2000
4000
5000
6000

Ownership Retained
(MedTech, Inc.)

80%
60%
50%
40%
35%

1000
2000
3500
4000
5000

Amount of Control

MedTech, Inc.
5
4
3
2
1
Divvy Out Capital

1500
2000
2500
3000
4000
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